inam ul rehman
A decade earlier there was a great hype given to “The road to stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan runs through the Valley of Kashmir.” It was a hyperbole then, and it proved so. Ever since the Taliban stormed Kabul and won it without a fight, most think tanks, intellectuals, analysts of the Indian state are wary that they will come to the disputed territory of Kashmir and wreak havoc! But why would the Taliban come to Kashmir?
What enmity does the Taliban have toward the state of India? What has the state of India done that the Taliban would cross the borders of Pakistan and start guerrilla war in Kashmir?
Of course, what prompts these speculations is the age-old trust deficit of India on the Islamic republic of Pakistan, and treating the Taliban as its proxy. While the former is a genuine concern the latter is a bloated view. The Taliban, in fact, most of the Afghans refuse to become proxies of anyone, and the former more so with its victory over the USA and allied forces to boost now. Then why are the Indians making a raging bull out of the Taliban?
The Taliban coming to Kashmir?
The most important worry that concerns India is that with the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan the hardened multinational fighters may trickle over to the Indian part of Kashmir.
In the earlier 90s many foreign national militants came to Kashmir to fight alongside the local rebels. It included a significant chunk of Pakistanis, who were mistakenly identified as Afghans. Although it is believed that some Afghan fighters came to Kashmir, but their numbers were miniscule (https://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/24/world/afghans-joining-rebels-in-kashmir.html). And remember it was the 90s when even al Qaeda was on good terms with the state of Pakistan. Pakistani author, Ahmad Rashid in his book writes that in 1998 the head of the then Taliban, Mullah Omar, stated that although his organisation supports Jihad in Kashmir, but the Afghan men fighting in Kashmir have gone on their own. (Taliban: The story of the Afghan Warlords).
At that time militants from various nationalists fought Pakistan’s war in Kashmir, but once the September 11, 2001, events took place these militants realised that they are expendables for the Pakistani state and the latter has no hesitation in killing, arresting, or selling them for dollars.
Twenty years of war in which the Taliban was virtually fighting it all alone has taught it that when it comes to nation states, religion holds no bonds. That is why the Taliban–considered Islamic fundamentalists, conservative, medieval, barbarian—choose communist China and Russia as their guarantors, not Turkey, Pakistan, or Saudi Arabia. This is not the Taliban of the 90s which will seek relations only with the Muslim countries. Their then guarantors, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, left them to fend for themselves once the USA showed its intent in occupying Afghanistan.
If the Indian state thinks that Pakistan would convince the Taliban to allow its land to train militants it is an error on the part of policy makers. Pakistan’s proxy in Afghanistan, Hezb-i-Islami, has lost its credentials, and the Taliban would not allow it to have militant camps anathema to India. The Taliban have repeatedly said that they are not going to meddle in the affairs of any other state. But then the Indian state’s posture is not to believe it! Strangely the Taliban did the same thing even when it ruled Afghanistan for the first time. And remained true to its word.
And if the Talibs do come they have to come via Pakistan. But can Pakistan afford this? The Indian state has already made its intent well known with surgical strikes inside Pakistan. The Pakistani state understands this game. Perhaps the same state would not hesitate to retaliate in Afghanistan if Taliban members are found attacking Indian forces in Kashmir.
The Taliban are a far greater danger to Pakistan than India.
But the important question that one needs to ask: Why would Afghans try to meddle in Indian affairs when the latter has ostensibly done developmental works there? India has consistently refused to get militarily involved in Afghanistan for which they received appreciation from the Taliban (Policy Research Group: “Taliban praises India for rejecting US request to send army to Afghanistan” 19 June, 2012).
Having previously ruled Afghanistan, and now brought it under its order again, the Taliban is not going to repeat the mistakes that the warlords committed in the early 90s. The Indian state thinks that the Taliban’s ascension in Afghanistan is against its interest. It is a strange fear of the unknown. Indian think tanks, analysts, and journalists have created a kerfuffle on the Taliban. The Taliban coming to power in Afghanistan is danger to Muslim countries, and Pakistan in particular. If the Taliban is successful in implementing Sharia it will have a ripple effect throughout the Muslim world which may bring a kind of revolution.
For sure the Taliban government in Afghanistan is not going to be a proxy of Pakistan. Afghans are a proud race who, like most of the people in the world, don't want to be ruled by foreigners.
The state of Pakistan would try not to have a stable Taliban ruling Afghanistan. After all, a stable Afghanistan under the Taliban would pose an enormous challenge for the Islamic republic of Pakistan where many Sharia laws have been passed by the parliament but not implemented. Having chaos, and fratricide under the Taliban regime will suit the interests of the Pakistani state as it would once again show to its people that Sharia based rule is not feasible in this world. It would also give leverage to Pakistan to interfere in Afghanistan matters.
In power the Taliban has to consolidate first. It will not try to get muddled into the affairs of other states. Once the statecraft traps the Taliban in its beautiful embrace it will be seen how it behaves. Implementing Sharia is not a one day job, it may take ages for them to be successful in it, or it may collapse. There is no midway for them.
So, it seems paranoia that Talibs will come to Kashmir.
The immediate task of the Taliban will be to tame the Islamic State. And to get rid of it will require a lot of political negotiations, diplomacy, and strength. The Taliban will also try to Talbanise Pakistan’s tribal community. For Pakistan containing the Taliban is a huge worry. There is every chance, as is quite visible in Pakistan, that the former will have a cascading effect on the internal politics of the latter. India can utilise that time to leapfrog ahead and emerge not only as an economic power but a military one as well. But for that India has to solve the Kashmir quagmire.
Why is India clubbing Pakistan and the Taliban together?
Since India is an emerging superpower in soft power with Bollywood movies, TV serials, and media, it perhaps suits Indian interests to pitch the Taliban with Pakistan. The Pakistani state is caught in a dilemma which it cannot do away with. It cannot bluntly say that the Taliban is an independent entity because it will stop funding coming to Pakistan and will also anger its people. Bracketing the Taliban with Pakistan also gives an impression to the other countries that the problem in Afghanistan is because of Pakistan and as such the latter should deal with it. If foreign countries come under this influence, which is likely, it means that Pakistan would have less time to concentrate on Kashmir, in this way the Indian state’s statecraft would bear fruit. With Pakistan distracted, the Indian state hopes that the problem in Kashmir would be over by the time Pakistan gets any breather from Afghanistan.
Where lies the danger?
The real danger for the state of India is transnational jihadists coming to Kashmir. Already al Qaeda, Islamic State, both these global organisations have shown great interest in Kashmir and have become glocal.
The Taliban and al Qaeda are almost one, but would the Taliban allow al Qaeda to have camps that would train and arm Kashmiri militants? Would the state of Pakistan strike a deal with both these transnational jihadists and let them go to Kashmir? Unlikely. Al Qaeda is wary of Pakistan and knows it cannot rely on it as the Pakistani state has no compunction to betray its own jihadists. Also, Pakistan would never strike a deal with al Qaeda as it knows it cannot control it unlike the pro-Pakistan militant groups operating in Kashmir. Al Qaeda in the past tried to instigate both the nuclear neighbours to go to war and nearly succeeded only for the US intervention to prevent it.
Where does it leave al Qaeda which has in the past shown its presence in Kashmir? Al Qaeda is a grave threat for the Indian state in Kashmir, while extremist Islamic State may add a nuisance value. Both these proscribed glocal organisations are not state sponsored, and as such are tough to deal with.
With no Hurriyat in Kashmir, and most of their leaders in jail there is no one who would put opposition to these global jihadists. The state has virtually handed over Kashmir to extremists. The state should not fear the coming of the Taliban, but the tactical silence of the people. And question itself: Is the silence of the Kashmiri people a nod toward Talibanisation?
Cartoon courtesy: Baltimoresun.com, and the cartoon movement
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